Exclusive | In-Depth Look into Upbit's U.S. Listing: South Korea's Largest Cryptocurrency Exchange More Profitable than Coinbase, Yet Valued at Only 1/7

By: blockbeats|2025/11/28 16:30:07
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Original Article Title: "Exclusive | In-depth Look at Upbit's Listing in the US: South Korea's Largest Crypto Exchange More Profitable Than Coinbase, But Valued at Only 1/7"
Original Article Author: Lin Wan Wan, Dose of Beating

On November 27, 2025, a "small earthquake" occurred in the South Korean cryptocurrency community.

Upbit, as the absolute dominant player in the Korean market, fell victim to a hack, with 54 billion Korean won (approximately $36 million) disappearing into thin air. Later, Upbit revised the amount to 44.5 billion Korean won of lost Solana network assets.

However, the market's panic was quickly absorbed.

Because based on Upbit's quarterly net profit of about $200 million, Upbit would only need 2 weeks to earn back the stolen amount.

Just three days before the theft, Upbit's parent company Dunamu announced a "century-old marriage" with South Korea's internet giant Naver Financial, preparing for an IPO on the US stock market, with a current valuation of $10.3 billion.

Behind this merger lies not only South Korea's old and new conglomerates but also a Korean super financial group heading to the US stock market.

In this world, many seemingly isolated "black swan" events, when connected, often turn out to be just a speck of dust falling from a massive "grey rhino."

Theft and Merger

First, we must categorize the nature of this "theft."

$36 million is a significant amount. But in front of a trading platform, we must learn to do the math.

According to Dunamu, Upbit's parent company, the 2024 financial report presented at the annual shareholders' meeting: annual operating profit of 1.18 trillion Korean won (approximately $8-9 billion), net profit of 983.8 billion Korean won (approximately $700 million), a year-on-year increase of 22.2%.

Evidently, this stolen amount is merely a mosquito bite to its massive balance sheet.

Currently, the South Korean Financial Supervisory Service has tentatively identified the clandestine hand behind the scenes as the North Korean Lazarus Group. Official analysis indicates that this attack replicated the "permission hijacking" technique from 6 years ago, where hackers likely stole or impersonated an administrator's account to transfer funds, rather than directly infiltrating servers. Currently, South Korean regulatory authorities have urgently dispatched to Upbit's headquarters for an on-site investigation.

But it was this particular bite from a mosquito that exposed a deeper issue: Upbit has become too big. So big that its cash flow is enough to entice hackers, and its sheer existence is enough to make regulatory authorities wary.

This is why the "century merger" three days ago was so crucial. If the theft showed Upbit's financial strength, then the merger revealed its anxiety and ambition.

According to public information, Naver Financial (Naver's financial branch) will engage in a full equity swap with Dunamu (Upbit's parent company).

Here is an extremely counterintuitive data point. In terms of operating profit, Upbit is at 1.18 trillion Korean won; Naver Financial is only at 103.5 billion Korean won.

This means that Upbit is making 10 times the amount of money compared to the other party.

Exclusive | In-Depth Look into Upbit's U.S. Listing: South Korea's Largest Cryptocurrency Exchange More Profitable than Coinbase, Yet Valued at Only 1/7

With such a stark difference in profitability, why merge?

In theory, this should have been an "upward attack" or "takeover" by Upbit on Naver Financial. However, in the world of capital, logic has never been about who has more money being the boss.

Therefore, this merger is more about cooperation between South Korean political interest groups. Upbit, representing the internet and emerging industry "new political power faction" behind Naver, has extended an olive branch to gain Naver's strong political protection. Only through this kind of structural reorganization, leveraging Naver's shell, or using Naver's endorsement, can they bypass South Korean regulations and go straight to the U.S. Nasdaq.

For more details on Upbit's listing, we exclusively interviewed Jason Huang, Founder of NDV USD Fund, an investor with a long-term focus and systematic research on the South Korean cryptocurrency trading ecosystem.

NDV is a compliance-oriented hedge fund focused on "digital asset stocks + derivatives", known for its stringent risk control with independent custody and auditing. In terms of past performance, NDV's first fund, Fund I, has had outstanding performance, achieving a 275.5% net settlement return within two years.

Below is our interview.

Interview on Upbit Listing

The Probe: What is Upbit expected to achieve through a U.S. listing?

Jason: Currently, the merger between Upbit's parent company Dunamu and Naver Financial may be the largest in Crypto history.

After the merger, following the typical preparation period for US stocks, it is expected to take 8-9 months. If all goes smoothly, ideally, the company is expected to file for listing in the second half of 2026.

From what I understand, the world's largest top-tier investment banks are competing to be their underwriters, as it is also one of the best-performing projects. For example, Kraken only turned a profit in the third quarter of this year and has already reached a valuation of $200 billion.

Dongzuo: How is Upbit's compliance and listing preparation?

Jason: Upbit is a very mature and transparent company, essentially equivalent to a "pre-listed company." It is currently audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Korea and is one of the five compliant exchanges in Korea. Therefore, the level of compliance is similar to that of Coinbase in its early years.

The company has no preferred shares, only common stock, and its information disclosure is transparent. The listing preparation work has been basically completed, and after the merger, it is only waiting for regulatory approval.

Dongzuo: Upbit is currently valued at $10.3 billion. How do you view this valuation?

Jason: This is clearly a project with a significant discount in the primary market.

Comparing it to the US exchange platform Coinbase, which currently has a market capitalization of around $70 billion and a Price-to-Earnings ratio (PE) of about 30-40 times, Robinhood's PE ratio even reaches 60-70 times.

In contrast, Upbit's valuation in the primary market is only about $10 billion. Even considering the "Korean discount," Upbit remains a very attractive value proposition. Top investment bank bankers believe this is a multi-billion dollar opportunity.

The so-called "Korean discount" has long existed in the Korean stock market. This is due to factors such as geopolitical risks and the chaebol governance structure, leading to Korean companies generally having lower valuations than similar companies globally.

However, if Upbit were just a profitable trading platform, its upside would only be the next Coinbase. But what is truly more valuable is the just completed acquisition.

The parent company of Upbit, Dunamu, exchanged shares with Naver Financial at a ratio of approximately 1:2.5. If we consider market capitalization: Dunamu, the parent company of Upbit, holds a share of 3, and Naver Financial holds a share of 1. After the merger, the CEO of Upbit's parent company remains the new single largest shareholder.

Insight: What does this merger with Naver Financial signify?

Jason: Let's use an analogy.

What is Naver? It is Korea's Google plus Amazon.

What is Naver Financial? It is Korea's "Alipay" or "Google Pay".

Therefore, this merger will create an unprecedented financial giant. We can think of it as a triad of "Coinbase (exchange) + Google Pay (payment) + Circle (stablecoin)."

Insight: Why mention Circle?

Because the new South Korean government is vigorously promoting a Korean won stablecoin. Referring to Circle's annual substantial revenue payment to Coinbase as a "protection fee" business model, this process will definitely involve Upbit.

Currently, there is no company in the market that can simultaneously possess both a "traditional payment license" and a "cryptocurrency exchange license," and both are national-level applications. The valuation logic of this ecological closed loop is no longer just a simple PE multiple; it is the multiplier effect of platform economics, and it is a good business.

If Coinbase is considered a "trading platform + stablecoin partnership" and Robinhood is a "broker + crypto on-ramp," then in the future, if Upbit completes the merger and issues a Korean won stablecoin, it will look more like a "payment infrastructure + trading platform + native stablecoin" ecosystem.

This is also why current investors believe that the $10.3 billion valuation is a "bargain."

Insight: You mentioned Coinbase earlier. Will Upbit have lower operational costs than Coinbase?

Jason: Yes, Upbit's operating cost is only one-tenth of Coinbase's.

Interviewer: Why is there such a significant cost difference?

Jason: Coinbase operates in the United States and competes globally with Robinhood, Binance, and Kraken. Therefore, it incurs high U.S. labor and compliance costs and is still burning cash to compete.

On the other hand, Upbit operates in the Korean market where competition has basically been eliminated. As the holder of the world's second-largest spot trading volume, second only to Binance, Upbit enjoys an absolute monopoly position.

In economics, this is called the "rent in excess of a natural monopoly," where nearly every additional unit of revenue can be directly converted into net profit.

This has created a significant "valuation gap": a giant with a profit margin far exceeding Coinbase, holding a monopoly position, yet its valuation is only one-seventh of Coinbase's.

For capital, this obvious value mismatch is an enticing target. They are betting on one thing: by listing in the U.S., they can fill this huge valuation gap.

Coinbase faces global competition in the U.S. market and needs to deal with ongoing competition from Kraken, Robinhood, and other rivals. In contrast, the Korean market's competition has been mostly eliminated, and Upbit's monopoly position allows it to more efficiently convert every additional unit of revenue into profit.

Interviewer: If Upbit's valuation is so undervalued, why would anyone want to sell their first-tier equity?

Jason: Some Koreans believe that they cannot fully control the entire listing cycle and are worried that the listing may occur during a bear market. Some people hope to cash out at the current stage.

Personally, even in a bear market, a valuation of $10.3 billion still offers a strong cost-performance ratio.

Interviewer: Many media outlets have reported that Masayoshi Son also played a role in this acquisition?

Jason: That's inaccurate. Masayoshi Son only holds shares in Naver's parent company, and in this merger of its subsidiary Naver Financial, Masayoshi Son is not considered involved. It's like the recent reports of Jack Ma buying Ethereum, which is not true; he is just a shareholder, and Jack Ma may not even know that he has bought Ethereum. Similarly, Masayoshi Son probably doesn't even know that he drove their largest acquisition in South Korea, haha.

Wrap-up: Lastly, let's discuss your view on the cryptocurrency market. How do you see the macro market environment for next year?

Jason: We are optimistic about next year. We were interviewed a few months ago and predicted a 30%-50% pullback within six months, which has now essentially occurred. Retail investors who needed to exit have already done so, and leverage has been largely cleared.

As long as the U.S. is in a rate-cutting environment next year, risk assets are unlikely to decline, and the market is poised for a good performance.

Epilogue

Back to the beginning.

While ordinary retail investors are still lamenting the loss of $35 million in the Upbit incident, true investors are calculating stock-for-stock ratios and planning the Nasdaq bell-ringing ceremony.

This is a power transition in Korean business history.

With the merger with Naver, Upbit is demonstrating this governance structure upgrade. The future Upbit will no longer be just a place for trading coins but a comprehensive fintech group integrating payment, trading, and stablecoins.

This is not a power play of who controls whom but a strategic choice to adapt to the global wave of cryptocurrency regulation.

Upbit is becoming a typical example of a non-U.S. cryptocurrency industry: cryptocurrency exchanges from various countries are all headed in the same direction, from the gray area to the beginning of political cooperation.

Original Article Link

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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